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Abstract Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-
known options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the co-
evolutionary dynamics of these behavioral traits in the individual level are not
well understood. Here we investigate the continuous voluntary public good
game, in which individuals have two types of continuous-valued options: a
probability of joining the public good game and a level of cooperative in-
vestment in the game. Our numerical results reveal hitherto unreported phe-
nomena: (i) The evolutionary dynamics are initially characterized by oscil-
lations in individual cooperation and participation levels, in contrast to the
population-level oscillations that have previously been reported. (ii) Eventu-
ally, the population’s average cooperation and participation levels converge
to and stabilize at a center. (iii) Then, a most peculiar phenomenon unfolds:
The strategies present in the population diversify and give rise to a “cloud” of
tinkering individuals who each tries out a different strategy, and this process
T. Sasaki
Facluty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria
Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361
Laxenburg, Austria
Graduate School of Engineering, Soka University, 192-8577 Tokyo, Japan
Tel.: +43-1-4277-50774
E-mail: tatsuya.sasak@univie.ac.at
A˚. Bra¨nnstro¨m
Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics, University of Ume˚a, 90187 Ume˚a,
Sweden
Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361
Laxenburg, Austria
I. Okada
Department of Business Administration, Soka University, 192-8577 Tokyo, Japan
T. Unemi
Department of Information Systems Science, Soka University, 192-8577 Tokyo, Japan
2 Tatsuya Sasaki et al.
continues unchecked as long as the population’s cooperation and participa-
tion levels remain balanced. Over time, however, imbalances build up as a
consequence of random drift and there is a sudden and abrupt collapse of the
strategy-diversity cloud. The process then repeats again in a cyclic manner. To
understand the three aforementioned phenomena, we investigate the system
analytically using adaptive-dynamics techniques. Our analysis casts light on
the mechanisms which underpin the unexpected and surprising evolutionary
dynamics.
Keywords social dilemmas · evolution of cooperation · voluntary participa-
tion · adaptive dynamics · diversification
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010) 91A06 · 91A22 · 91A40
1 Introduction
The reasons for the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is
an enduring puzzle in biology and the social sciences [1,2,3,4]. The nature of
this puzzle is often characterized as follows: groups of cooperators outperform
groups of defectors, but defectors always outperform cooperators in any mixed
group [5]. This represents a social-dilemma situation: individual interests and
the communal benefit are incompatible. Many theoretical and experimental
investigations of cooperative behavior have employed the framework of the
public goods game [6,7]. Typical public good games can be described as follows:
cooperators in an N -player group with N ≥ 2 invest the same amount c > 0
to a public pool and defectors do nothing at all; then, the total amount of
investment is multiplied by a factor r > 1 and distributed equally among all
members of the group despite the preceding different investment levels [8].
With r < N , it follows that the marginal profit c(r/N − 1) is negative and
thus each player is better off defecting than cooperating, irrespective of the
other players decisions, i.e., defection dominates cooperation. Cooperators are
thus evolutionarily doomed by defectors. This is in contrast to the case r > N
in which each player is better off cooperating and, consequently, no social
dilemma exists.
Here we focus on the effects of voluntary participation (or exit) on the evo-
lution of cooperation [9,10,11,12]. In modern societies individuals often have
a great deal of freedom and anonymity. This allows an individual to get away
with not only free-riding, but also opting-out types of behavior. Voluntary
participation appears to be the simplest mechanism for promoting coopera-
tion that can be justified as an a priori option even under complete anonymity.
This mechanism has been studied in the standard voluntary public good game
consists of three pure strategies: cooperation, defection, and nonparticipation.
The latter strategy is used by players who opt out of public good games
and instead constantly earn a payoff σ > 0 [13,14]. If successful strategies are
assumed to increase in frequency, for example through imitation dynamics,
a “rock-scissors-paper”-type rotational change in dominating strategy arises
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among the three pure strategies. Cooperation can therefore be maintained
through population-level oscillations in the relative frequencies of these three
pure strategies.
The standard voluntary public goods game assumes that each player has
one of three pure behavioral strategies [13,14]. In many situations, it is more
plausible to assume that players differ continuously in cooperative investments
and participation probability, but the consequences of this assumption has
thus far not been explored. Here, we investigate a continuous voluntary public
goods game in which individuals are able to make continuously varying degrees
of investment levels [15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26] and also alter their
participation rates [27,28]. Surprisingly, we find that the emerging cooperative
dynamics are very different from those of the standard public good game and
in particular involve a hitherto unreported phase of strategy expansion and
collapse. By drawing on both evolutionary game theory and the theory of
adaptive dynamics, we can analytically understand and explain almost all of
the unfolding phenomena, thus revealing important insights for the evolution
of cooperation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe a continuous
voluntary public good game and provide an individual-based model of the
gradual evolution of cooperation and participation in public good games. In
Sect. 3, we conduct numerical simulations of the individual-based model which
demonstrate cyclic oscillation, convergence to the center, growth of “cloud”
and its collapse. In Sect. 4, we then compare those results with the theoretical
predictions. We determine the expected payoff and invasion fitness and analyze
the selection gradient and equilibria for monomorphic populations. To explore
effects of small yet finite mutations, we also consider a geometrical analysis and
polymorphic populations. Finally, in Sect. 5, we provide further discussion.
2 Model description
2.1 Continuous voluntary public good game
We consider a well-mixed population. An individual has a continuous strategy
involving two traits (c, p) in U := [0, 1]2. The first coordinate c represents the
amount of investment that the individual makes in the public good game. The
second coordinate p represents the probability of participation in this game.
For each game N individuals with N ≥ 2 are randomly selected from the
population. Each of the N -players first determines whether to participate in
the public good game or not, with one’s own probability p. Those who par-
ticipate can contribute an investment at a cost c to themselves. All individual
contributions are added up and multiplied with a factor r with r > 1. This
amount is then shared equally among all participants. Each participant’s pay-
off is given as a net benefit that consists of his or her share less the amount
invested. Individuals who do not participate in the public good game instead
receive a small payoff σ with 0 < σ < r − 1 that is independent of outcomes
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of the public good game. We require σ > 0 to ensure that nonparticipation is
better off than a group of those who make no investment (c = 0), and that
σ < r− 1, that a group of those who make full investment (c = 1) is better off
than nonparticipation. We assume that if there is only one participant, this
single player has to act as a nonparticipant and therefore the payoff is σ.
It is well known that in the case of compulsory participation (p = 1 for all
individuals), no contribution with c = 0 is only Nash equilibrium for r < N
[23]. A focal participant i0 with c = c0 will earn in a game with N−1 co-players
with cooperation levels {c1, · · · , cN−1} the payoff P (i0) =
r
N
∑N−1
k=0 ck − c0.
Thus, the marginal profit per unit increase in the focal player’s contribution is
given by dP/dc0 = r/N −1. With r < N , this is negative and each participant
is tempted to reduce own contribution to zero: c = 0 is (weakly) dominant, or
with r > N , the marginal profit is positive and c = 1 is (weakly) dominant.
Therefore, we hereafter concentrate on the most stringent case with r < N .
2.2 Individual-based model
In the individual-based model, strategies spread in a finitely large popula-
tion with size M by imitation and exploration (“social learning”). We assume
that individuals are more likely to imitate strategies of those who have earned
higher payoffs. For simplicity, we straightforwardly apply the replicator dy-
namics to the finite population as in Doebeli et al. [20].
We consider asynchronous sequential updating of the finite population, as
follows. First, a focal individual i0 is randomly picked up from the population.
The i0’s payoff P (i0), then, is determined through an interaction with N − 1
co-players selected randomly, {i1, · · · , iN−1}. After making a participating-
decision with one’s own participation rate, the focal individual’s payoff is set-
tled as
P (i0) =


r
S
S−1∑
k=0
ck − c0 if i0 participates and has a co-player,
σ otherwise,
(1)
where ck denotes the ik’s investment level and the first to (S − 1)-th players
among the N − 1 co-players (1 < S ≤ N) are participants.
For comparison, another model individual j0 is randomly chosen, and then,
its payoff P (j0) is determined as in Eq. (1) through an interaction with random
N − 1 co-players selected independent of the i0’s case. Whether the focal
individual i0 imitates the model j0 is determined with a probability w that
is proportional to those payoff difference: w = P (j0)−P (i0)
α
if P (j0) > P (i0);
otherwise, if P (j0) ≤ P (i0), w = 0. In the former case, α is fixed as
r(N−1)
N
−
( r
N
−1), which denotes the maximum degree among available payoff differences,
and thus, ensures that w ≤ 1. Its first term represents the payoff of a full-
defector (with c = 0) withinN−1 full-cooperators (with c = 1), and the second
term represents the payoff of a full-cooperator within N − 1 full-defectors.
Continuous voluntary public good games 5
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Fig. 1 Evolutionary history consisting of oscillation and dispersal. The initial state is
monomorphic at (c, p) = (0, 0). Mean investment level c¯ (a), mean participation rate p¯ (b),
standard deviations of investment levels (black) and participation rates (red) (c), and 100-
step moving average of the correlation between the two traits c and p (d) are provided.
Coevolution of cooperation and participation is characterized by transitions between the
oscillation (white intervals) and dispersal (gray intervals) phases. The mean and the standard
deviation of investment levels first increases gradually because of neutral drift along the
boundary p = 0, and the mean participation rate p¯ remains close to 0, and then, increases
rapidly when the mean investment c¯ reaches about 0.5. After cycles for about 0.7×105
steps, the population attains a small neighborhood of the center Q. Interestingly, from
0.7×105 to 0.9×105 steps, another dynamical phase ensues, in which (c¯, p¯) is close to Q and
slightly oscillates with quite a small amplitude. Insufficient selection pressure there allows
the trait distribution to spread and increase in variance. Another dispersal phase appears
between 1.1×105 and 1.2×105 steps after the second oscillation phase. From c and d one
can observe that diversification can subsequently continue when the trait distribution keeps
its correlation sufficiently negative. In particular, the second dispersal phase shows that a
sudden contraction of diversity could occur when the negative correlation is lost. Parameter:
M = 104, µ = 0.001, s = 0.005, N = 5, r = 3, and σ = 1.
Finally, after the imitation event, the exploration can happen with a small
probability µ. In the case each trait is replaced by a value drawn independently
from a Gaussian distribution with the former value of the trait as mean and
a small standard deviation s.
3 Results
The individual-based model can embody surprisingly rich evolutionary pro-
cesses. These are characterized by transitions between two qualitatively differ-
ent dynamic phases, cyclic oscillation and diagonal dispersal. Figure 1 presents
a typical sequence of the oscillation and dispersal phases and those correspond-
6 Tatsuya Sasaki et al.
0 1
1
c
p
Q
1 (step) 8,000 9,800 9,850
10,78010,40010,0509,880
10,960 11,100 12,000 14,500
Investment level, c
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
 r
a
te
, p
Fig. 2 Snapshots of the oscillation phase corresponding to Fig. 1 (up to 14,500 steps).
Each panel shows a snapshot of the frequency distribution of strategies (from high to low:
red, orange, yellow, green, blue, white (for 0)) in the (c, p) space at a certain step. The
interior equilibrium Q is located at the intersection of the dashed nullclines c = 0.5 and
p ≈ 0.5387, beyond which the selection pressure on p and c, respectively, changes. The
population is initially monomorphic at (c, p) = (0, 0). Neutral drift first drives diversification
of the investment level c along the boundary p = 0. As the distribution reaches around the
point (0.5, 0), mutants with c > 0.5 and p > 0 can happen and then successfully invade.
Such mutants eventually displace the residents, and monomorphism is re-established. From
there the population synchronously orbit the center Q. The orbit present is so distant from
Q that the boundary p = 0 absorbs it at the end. Then, neutral drift along p = 0 begins,
again.
ing snapshots are displayed in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively. In particular, Fig.
4 demonstrates a trial in which investment levels largely diverge into full co-
operation (c = 1) and defection (c = 0) (see also corresponding snapshots in
Fig. 5). We now explain each of the two dynamic phases in turn.
(i) Cyclic oscillation. Let the population start with a monomorphic state in
which all individuals adopt the same state as (c, p) = (0, 0) (Figs. 1 and
2). In the situation, any mutant with respect to the investment level c
is able to invade the resident through neutral drift, leading to a gradual
increase in the deviation of c, while the participation rates p are kept to
a low level corresponding to the probability µ and standard deviation s
of explorations. Then, about when the strategy distribution reaches the
critical investment level cQ given by σ/(r − 1) in Sect. 4.1, beyond which
the sign of the selection pressure on p changes, the widely spaced residents
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Fig. 3 Snapshots of the dispersal phase corresponding to Fig. 1 (from 107,050 to 114,530
steps). Panel features are the same as for Fig. 2. The cluster is already close to the center
Q at 107,050 steps. After converging to Q, the gradual radiation derived from neutral ex-
plorations starts across Q while its trend remains negative. This dispersal process leads to
splitting the residents into some distant subclusters after 112,000 steps. Finally, the lower-
right cluster that plays a major part in keeping the trend negative, vanishes accidentally.
This subsequently causes a dramatically rapid contraction of diversity, and then, the popu-
lation returns to monomorphism (114,530 steps).
along the line p = 0 are displaced by the invasion of a mutant with c > cQ
and p > 0, converging to a nearly homogeneous cluster quite rapidly.
When once leaving the line c = 0, monomorphic populations should move
along the orbits determined by the fitness landscape for a rare mutant
invading at the resident traits (called “selection gradient”, D(x) in Eq.
(7)), which revolve around the center Q. We remark that in the individual-
based model the orbit the population travels on would first be stochastically
selected, depending on the former invading mutant. Then, for orbits further
out, the population will eventually be absorbed to the boundary p = 0 after
orbiting, and again, be exposed to the effect of the neutral drift.
(ii) Convergence to the center. When orbits further in have been selected, the
directional selection pressure becomes so weak that the effects of the non-
zero correlation between the two traits are relatively considerable. Cycles
around the center Q can be observed in individual-based simulations for
typical sets of parameters for the standard voluntary public good game [13,
14]. According to the numerical investigations, the population is certain
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Fig. 4 Evolutionary history consisting of oscillation and dispersal. The initial state is
monomorphic at the center Q. Other parameters and panel features are as in Fig. 1. In this
trial a quite large standard deviation in the investment level c appears from 20,000 to 35,000
steps. As is shown in Fig. 5, complete branching into both the extreme levels c = 0 and
c = 1 ensues while the negative correlation between the two traits remains.
to reach a sufficiently small vicinity of Q sooner or later, differently of
the deterministic prediction by the canonical equation. In the case the
population faces the next dispersal phase.
(ii) Growth of the cloud and its collapse. After converging to Q, the cluster
starts radiating gradually. Some kinds of disturbance (e.g., arising from
finite population sizes) cause biased spreading, such that even if it is only
minor, minute fluctuations of the frequency distribution can occur, as ob-
served in each dispersal phase (a, b of Figs. 1 and 4). Although the out-
comes of such fluctuations are difficult to predict analytically, the numeri-
cal simulations demonstrate that the diversified distribution survives when
there has been a negative correlation between the two traits c and p, or
otherwise, does not.
Indeed, the first dispersal phase in Fig. 1 shows that the standard devia-
tions repeat a small growth-and-decline cycle simultaneously, but neither
has developed to a significant level. Then in the second dispersal phase,
there is distinct development of diagonally located clusters (see also Fig.
3) with a negative slope. If the diagonal dispersal goes further as shown in
Figs. 4 and 5, the resulting population can branch into two distinct clusters
quite distant from each other across Q and there is long-run maintenance
of a negative correlation over more than 30,000 steps.
The minute fluctuations remain throughout the dispersal phase, and are
likely to affect clusters relatively closer to Q. Such an affected cluster then
Continuous voluntary public good games 9
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Fig. 5 Snapshots of the dispersal phase corresponding to Fig. 4 (from 7,400 to 42,300 steps).
Panel features are the same as for Fig. 2. Two clusters that are distant from each other on
either side of Q emerge after 12,500 steps, and then evolve into two distinct branches, each of
which lies close to a pure strategy state, that is, full cooperation (c = 1) or defection (c = 0).
The right subcluster closer to Q becomes more widely distributed after 35,000 steps. After
the left cluster vanishes (41,000 and 42,200 steps), the diversity quickly contracts, and then
the population returns to monomorphism around Q (42,300 steps) (see also Fig. 3).
becomes more dispersed (sometimes splitting into subclusters). As a result,
the local trend that is restricted to such a dispersed subgroup may be
positive while the global trend still remains negative. This can cause an
increase in the amplitude of fluctuations and the instability of the global
population dynamics, often leading to extinction of some clusters. One can
observe bursts of fluctuations that result in the diversity of the distribution
being lost, as shown in Figs. 1 and 4. However, if a cluster that vanishes
has played a major part in maintaining the negative trend overall (see
Fig. 3, 114,490 steps; Fig. 5, 41,000 and 42,200 steps), then there can be
an incidental change to a positive trend. The positive correlation leads
the diversified population to abruptly contract, often to a nearly uniform
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state. The location to which the distribution has contracted is often so far
from the center Q that directional selection drives the population instead
of neutral drift. We thus return to the cyclic oscillation phase.
We have also checked that the evolutionary history with both oscillation
and dispersal as in Fig. 1 can happen for other parameters close to those for
Fig. 1, including large exploration probability 0.05. We note that the dispersal
phase is subdued compared to cases with high exploration probability µ or
large standard deviation of explorations s. By contrast, the oscillation phase
is largely unaffected by changes in the exploration parameters µ and s.
4 Analysis
Two complementary approaches are used for studying evolutionary dynam-
ics of continuous games: replicator dynamics on probability distributions of
strategies [29] and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics [30]. In the
former approach, all strategies are present in the population at all times, while
in the latter only certain resident strategies are present and other strategies
are tried out occasionally through tinkering with investment and participation
levels. In this section we use the mathematical framework of adaptive dynam-
ics [30,31,32,33] to analyze the evolution resulting from the individual-based
model.
4.1 Cyclic oscillation
Invasion fitness
We consider an infinitely large population and assume that at regular intervals
N individuals with N ≥ 2 are randomly selected and offered the option to
participate in the public good game. Consider a monomorphic resident in
which each individual uses the same strategy x = (cx, px). Let us introduce
invasion fitness S(x, y), that denotes the growth rate of a mutant strategy
y = (cy, py), in the monomorphic resident. We assume that the growth rate
of a rare mutant in a resident population is determined by the replicator
dynamics. We can thus obtain an expression for the invasion fitness for the
rare mutant within the resident population as follows:
S(x, y) = P (x, y)− P¯ (x), (2)
where P (x, y) describes the expected payoff of the mutant player with y inter-
acting with the other N − 1 resident players with x, and P¯ (x) expresses the
average payoff over the resident population (and thus P¯ (x) = P (x, x)). In the
model it is convenient to define by g(x, y) the mutant’s expected payoff when
the mutant participates in the public good game with its own probability py.
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Using this and the nonparticipant’s payoff σ, the mutant’s expected payoff is
given by a linear equation with respect to py:
P (x, y) = pyg(x, y) + (1− py)σ. (3)
See Eq. (A.1) in Appendix A.1 for details of g(x, y). This yields
P (x, y)=σ+(r−1)(cx−cQ)(1−(1−px)
N−1)py−(cy−cx)pyF (1−px), (4)
in which cQ = σ/(r − 1) and
F (z) = 1 + (r − 1)zN−1 −
r(1 − zN)
N(1− z)
. (5)
We note that the set of roots of F (z) in [0, 1] is only z = 1 for r ≤ 2, and in
addition there is a unique interior root zQ for r > 2 [14]. Then we find that the
invasion fitness in Eq. (2) is linear in the mutant traits cy and py, as follows,
S(x, y) = a10(x)(cy − cx) + a01(x)(py − px) + a11(x)(cy − cx)(py − px), (6)
where a10(x) = −pxF (1−px), a01(x) = (r− 1)(cx− cQ)(1− (1−px)
N−1), and
a11(x) = −F (1− px).
Selection gradient
The adaptive dynamics of the resident strategy x is governed by the selection
gradient as below, with the exception of the vicinity of its equilibrium points.
D(x) =


∂S(x,y)
∂cy
∣∣∣
y=x
∂S(x,y)
∂py
∣∣∣
y=x

 =
(
a10(x)
a01(x)
)
, (7)
so that x˙ = D(x). An example is given in Fig. 6. This vector associated with
strategy x points in the direction of the maximal increase of the mutant’s
advantage over the resident population: D(x) suggests the most favorable di-
rection. In general, the adaptive dynamics for monomorphic populations with
strategy x is expressed using its canonical equation x˙ = kV D(x), where V
is the variance-covariance matrix of the difference vector between the mutant
and its parent, and the coefficient k depends on the equilibrium for the pop-
ulation size and the mutational process [30,34,35]. From the assumptions of
the individual-based model, hereafter we analyze the canonical equation with
kV = 1 (unit matrix). The system being considered is
c˙ = −pF (1− p), (8)
p˙ = (r − 1)(c− cQ)(1− (1 − p)
N−1), (9)
which result in that every orbit has the line of symmetry c = cQ. We focus on
the upper half plane p > 0, excluding the exceptional line p = 0, a continuum of
equilibria. In the case r ≤ 2 (Fig. 6b), this plane is filled with the orbits issuing
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from the one half of the p-axis {c > cQ, p = 0}, moving counter-clockwise
around the point (cQ, 0), and converging to the other half {c < cQ, p = 0}.
When an orbit converges to the boundary of the strategy space, we assume
that the orbit then is governed by the selection gradient naturally projected
to the boundary. For instance, in Fig. 6b an orbit contacting the line c = 0
will move along this line with decrease in p, converging to p = 0.
We then turn to the case that r > 2 (Fig. 6a) (see [14] for the discrete
voluntary public good game). Dividing the right-hand sides in Eqs. (8) and
(9) by 1 − (1 − p)N−1, which corresponds to a change of velocity, thus does
not affect the orbits on the subspace. This yields
c˙ = −
pF (1− p)
1− (1− p)N−1
= −
F (1− p)
1 +
∑N−2
i=1 (1 − p)
i
, (10)
p˙ = (r − 1)(c− cQ). (11)
We define these as −g(p) and l(c), respectively. We then introduce H(c, p) :=
G(p) + L(c), where G(p) and L(c) are primitive functions of g(p) and l(c),
respectively. The function H is a constant of motion: H˙ = ∂H
∂c
c˙ + ∂H
∂p
p˙ ≡ 0.
The Hessian of H is symmetric positive definite (and thus H attains a strict
minimum) at the point Q = (cQ, pQ), where pQ equals 1 − zQ. We have used
the fact that F (zQ) = 0 and F
′(zQ) < 0 [14]. Therefore, a neighborhood of Q
is filled with closed periodic orbits.
To see the global dynamics, we explore the vicinity of the boundary point
(cQ, 0). The Jacobian for Eqs. (10) and (11) at this point is given by(
0 F
′(1)
N−1
r − 1 0
)
. (12)
We note that F ′(1) = ( r2−1)(N−1) > 0 for r > 2, in which case it follows that
the matrix has two real eigenvalues of different sign and thus the equilibrium
(cQ, 0) is a saddle point. For p > 0, the orbits in the vicinity of the saddle point
agrees with the orbits associated with Eqs. (8) and (9). Moreover, considering
the symmetry to the line c = cQ, the separatrices for the saddle point connect
each other and comprise the critical level set surrounding Q; its inside is filled
with the closed periodic orbits, and its outside is filled with heteroclinic orbits
issuing from the one half of the line {c > cQ, p = 0}, turning around Q, and
returning to the other half {c < cQ, p = 0}.
Singular strategies
Equilibrium points of the selection gradient are called singular strategies, and
they are given by solutions of D(x) = 0. If the monomorphic population takes
a singular strategy, the selection pressure on both the directions of c and p
vanishes; otherwise, the monomorphic population is always under directional
selection. From Eqs. (8) and (9), it follows that singular strategies of the
continuous voluntary public good game are given by the boundary line p = 0,
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and for r > 2, also the point Q. The dynamic analysis implies that Q is a center
surrounded locally by periodical closed orbits [36], and as long as mutants arise
infinitesimally rare and near, the monomorphic population on the cyclic orbit
should not reach the center Q.
For r > 2, the c-coordinate of Q, cQ = σ/(r − 1), increases with the non-
participant’s payoff σ and decreases with increasing the multiplication factor
r. Changes in the group size N do not affect the c-coordinate of Q. In the
case of its p-coordinate, pQ, we know from the differential (or difference) of F
in Eq. (5) with respect to r or N , that F (1 − p) decreases with increasing r
and increases with N . Considering that F (1− p) is positive for pQ < p ≤ 1 or
negative for 0 < p < pQ [14], thus the value of unique interior root pQ must
increase with r and decrease with increasing N .
If x is a singular strategy among Q and p = 0, the invasion fitness de-
generates, that is, S(x, y) = P (x, y) − P (x, x) = 0 holds for all strategy y
in the strategy space U . (We note that P (x, y) = σ = P (x, x) if x = Q or
px = 0.) This implies that Q and each point of p = 0 are (symmetric and not
strict) Nash equilibria and from the equality any mutant strategy may first
through neutral drift invade a resident population with the singular strategy.
In Appendix A.3 we fully analyze the replicator dynamics for two distinct
strategies in the continuous voluntary public good game. Indeed, we have that
S(Q, u) = 0 and S(u,Q) < 0 for all strategy u within {c < cQ, p > pQ} or
{c > cQ, 0 < p < pQ}. Considering Eq. (A.33), this indicates that the strate-
gies Q and u are mutually invasible in the replicator dynamics. In the case of a
resident population with p = 0, then any mutant y within {c > cQ, p > 0} can
invade and eventually replace the resident nonparticipation strategy. There-
fore, neither Q nor p = 0 is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [37,38] and
thus satisfy any of the following properties: evolutionary robust strategy [29],
strongly uninvadable strategy [39], and continuously stable strategy (CSS) [40].
In addition, if its initial fraction ε is sufficiently small, the mutant strategy
Q is not able to invade any nearby resident population in {c > cQ, p > pQ}
or {c < cQ, 0 < p < pQ}. Also considering that neutrality among strategies
with p = 0, this implies that neither Q nor p = 0 is an neighborhood invader
strategy (NIS) [41]. The singular strategies above are not always effective to
invade a nearby resident population.
When the population is monomorphic with strategy Q, then the canonical
equation, based on infinitesimal small mutations, is not able to predict the
evolutionary dynamics, because of the flatness of invasion fitness (S(Q, y) = 0
for all y in U) and substantial effects of neutral drift, instead of directional
selection. Indeed, with considering a more realistic situation in that explo-
ration is not always small and emergent innovation happens [42], evolutionary
dynamics can more easily result in branching and polymorphism [43,44,45,
46,47,48]. For instance, in a sufficiently small neighborhood of Q directional
selection is so weak that a next exploration would occur before substitution of
the resident strategy has been completed. For last decade fundamental tech-
niques to investigate convergence and stability for multi-dimensional adaptive
dynamics have been developed [49,50]. Yet satisfactory analyses of evolution-
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Fig. 6 Selection gradient depicted by Eqs. (8) and (9) for N = 5, and in a, r = 3 and
σ = 1, or in b, r = 1.8 and σ = 0.4. A set of singular strategies consists of the point
Q(0.5, pQ) and the line p = 0 (pQ ≈ 0.5387) in a or only the line in b. (a) The point Q is a
center surrounded by closed orbits. The point (0.5, 0) divides the boundary line p = 0 into
a left segment of stable fixed points (Lyapunov stable; closed circles) and a right segment
of unstable fixed points (open circles). (b) The strategy space U is filled with the orbits
connecting the right segment of p = 0 (or the line c = 1) and left segments of p = 0.
ary diversification around a non-ESS singular strategy, in particular like the
center Q, have not been published. In the following section, accordingly, to
investigate effects on cyclic orbits of small, but finite mutations, we will ex-
pand the analysis of adaptive dynamics to the neutral direction along normal
vectors of the selection gradient.
4.2 Convergence to the center
Here we will provide a geometrical analysis of local evolutionary dynamics and
classify the strategy space U into four regions, depending on the abilities to
invade and to be invaded for a given strategy [51]. Of particular interest is
to explore whether there is a meaningful trait region in which evolutionary
branching can happen. Coupling these abilities generates a two-dimensional
pairwise invasibility plot [31], clarifying what type of evolutionary scenarios
happen between minor mutants and major residents.
From the arrangement of the singular strategies and isoclines, the subspace
of U , in which both the directional selection pressure do not vanish, are nat-
urally divided to four types of quadrant around Q, I = {c > cQ, p > pQ}, II
= {c < cQ, p > pQ}, III = {c < cQ, p < pQ}, and IV = {c > cQ, p < pQ}. Let
us look the curve Cm = {(cy, py)|S(x, y) = 0}, which goes through the given
focal point x and separates regions of (mutational) strategies that can invade
into the resident population with x from strategies that cannot. Equation (6)
yields that Cm is a hyperbolic curve for all points x in U except x = Q, as
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Table 1 Sign configurations of indexes for geometric analysis
regions I II III IV
a01(x) + − − +
a11(x) − − + +
slope: p′y(x) + − + −
κm(x) + + + +
κr(x) − − + +
κr(x)− κm(x) − − + +
follows:
py
[
cy −
(
cx −
a01(x)
a11(x)
)]
= px
(
a01(x)
a11(x)
){
< 0 if x ∈ I ∪ III,
> 0 if x ∈ II ∪ IV.
(13)
The asymptotic lines of the hyperbola Cm are thus given by py = 0 and
cy = cx − a01(x)/a11(x). The asymptotic line py = 0 means that all we need
to consider is the upper one of two connected components of the hyperbola,
because the lower one is located entirely out of U . Then, let us consider the
curve Cr = {(cy, py)|S(y, x) = 0}, which separates (resident) strategies that
can be invaded by a given mutant with x from strategies that cannot. It is
obvious that Cr goes through x and Q. We analyze Cr locally in the neighbor-
hood of x. From a straightforward calculation, we can obtain that Cr and Cm
have identical slopes at x. So, to clarify the local arrangement of Cm and Cr,
there remains only an investigation of these second order approximations be-
cause Cm is a quadric curve. Appendix A.2 provides calculations of curvatures
κm(x) and κr(x) of Cm and Cr at x, respectively, and estimations of signs of
these curvatures and the difference between them. Signs of all indexes we need
to consider are displayed on Table 1 and organized by the four quadrants I,
II, III, and IV.
From Table 1, we can obtain complete information about possible combina-
tions of the signs of S(x, y) and S(y, x) in the vicinity of a focal point x. Figure
7 provides typical plots ofCr and Cm, and configurations of (sgnS(x, y), sgnS(y, x)).
According to Appendix A.3, in the continuous voluntary public good game the
type of frequency dynamics between any two strategies x1 and x2 can be deter-
mined by (sgnS(x2, x1), sgnS(x1, x2)). As such, the case of (sgnS(x, y), sgnS(y, x)) =
(+,−) means that the mutant with y can invade the resident population with
x and inevitably replace it. On the other hand, the case of (−,+) means that
the mutant y cannot invade the resident x and any mixed state of strategies x
and y leads to extinction of y. The case of (+,+) means that strategies x and
y can invade mutually and there is uniquely a stable coexisting state. The case
of (−,−) means that strategies x and y cannot invade each other, and thus, the
monomorphic resident population with x is stable if the number of mutants
is infinitesimally small. For a given point x under directional selection, the
neighborhood of x always has two types of combinations, (+,−) and (−,+),
in the front of and behind x along the direction of evolution, respectively.
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Fig. 7 Geometric analysis of pairwise invasibility for N = 5, r = 3, and σ = 1. The point
Q (0.5, pQ) is a center surrounded by cyclic orbits (pQ ≈ 0.5387). The focal points x are given
by (0.7, 0.7), (0.3, 0.7), (0.2957, 0.361), and (0.7043, 0.361) in a, b, c, and d, respectively.
These points ride on the same orbit Cx and are located, respectively, in quadrants II, III,
IV, and I around Q, which have different local arrangements of the two specific curves,
Cm : S(x, y) = 0 and Cr : S(y, x) = 0. The curves Cm and Cr are tangent to each other at
the focal point x. Cm is a hyperbola, and Cr passes through Q. These curves are orthogonal
to the orbit Cx. Sign couplings, e.g. (+,−), means (sgn S(x, y), sgn S(y, x)). For instance,
a rare mutant with y in the (+,−)-part is able to invade the resident population with the
focal strategy x (because S(x, y) > 0); yet a rare mutant with x is not able to invade the
resident population with y (because S(y, x) < 0). According to Appendix A.3, this indicates
that the focal resident x can be replaced with any mutant in the the (+,−)-part.
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Considering the signs of curvatures of Cm and Cr, local evolutionary dy-
namics can be classified to four types, corresponding to the four regions I, II,
III, and IV, as in the following list. Let us denote as Cx the orbital curve at
x, and as Nx the line orthogonal to Cx at x.
I Cm is concave and Cr is convex to the direction of evolution along the orbit
Cx. Cr is located behind Cm. We have (sgn S(x, y), sgn S(y, x)) = (−,−)
at the gap between Cm and Cr. Nx is in the gap and sandwiched by these
curves.
II Cm is convex and Cr is concave to the direction of evolution along Cx. Cr
is located in the front of Cm. We have (+,+) at the gap between Cm and
Cr. Nx is included in the gap.
III Both Cm and Cr are convex to the direction of evolution along Cx. Cr is
located behind Cm. We have (−,−) at the gap between Cm and Cr. Nx is
located in the front of both Cm and Cr and within (+,−)-sign part.
IV Both Cm and Cr are concave to the direction of evolution along Cx. Cr
is located in the front of Cm. We have (+,+) at the gap between Cm and
Cr. Nx is located behind both Cm and Cr and within (−,+)-part.
4.3 Growth of the cloud and its collapse
Invasion fitness for polymorphic populations
We focus on stable dimorphism arising by (+,+)-part in II or IV. A mutant
arising from the (+,+)-part for the focal point x is invasible to and can co-
exist with x. So far, it has been assumed that the focal resident population
is monomorphic. According to Appendix A.1, polymorphic populations with
strategy distribution X are naturally mapped on monomorphic populations
with strategy x∗ while the mapping pi keeps the invasion fitness unchanged:
S(X, y) = S(x∗, y). (14)
The mapping x∗ = (cx∗ , px∗) = pi(X) is given by that px∗ = p¯x and cx∗ =
c¯x+Cov(X)/p¯x in Eqs. (A.9) and (A.10). Equation (14) means that arguments
for monomorphic resident populations can extend to polymorphic resident
populations by using the representative strategy x∗. Coexisting patches of
X must then be situated on the hyperbola Cr∗ = {(cy, py)|S(x
∗, y) = 0}
associated with x∗; in particular, in the case of two patches, these are located
on Cr∗ across x
∗.
Selection gradient for polymorphic populations
To understand in depth how strategic diversification can affect the evolution-
ary fate of populations, we would need to extend the selection gradient to
polymorphic resident populations. We assume that a rare mutant is stochas-
tically emerging around each patch of a resident population and the mutant’s
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probability distribution is proportional to the frequency distribution of the res-
ident population. Let X = {(xi, ni)}i=1,··· ,K be the distribution of a polymor-
phic resident population with finite support, where xi = (cxi , pxi) and each ni
denotes the relative frequency of strategy xi with
∑
1≤i≤K ni = 1. We then em-
ploy the mutant’s distribution Y related toX , such that Y = {(yi, ni)}i=1,··· ,K
where any yi(= (cyi , pyi)) is sufficiently close to xi.
To predict evolutionary trajectories after diversification, we define an inte-
grated selection gradient for the averaged strategy of the resident distribution
X , x¯ = (c¯x, p¯x), as a weighted sum of the selection gradient induced by each
mutant strategy yi arising near xi, that is,
D(x¯) :=


∑K
i=1 ni
∂S(X,yi)
∂cyi
∣∣∣
yi=xi∑K
i=1 ni
∂S(X,yi)
∂pyi
∣∣∣
yi=xi

 , (15)
where
∂S(X, yi)
∂cyi
∣∣∣∣
yi=xi
= a10(x
∗) + a11(x
∗)(pxi − px∗), (16)
∂S(X, yi)
∂pyi
∣∣∣∣
yi=xi
= a01(x
∗) + a11(x
∗)(cxi − cx∗). (17)
Then, Eq. (15) is rewritten as
D(x¯) =

 a10(x∗)
a01(x
∗)− a11(x
∗)
Cov(X)
p¯x

 = ( a10(x¯)
a01(x¯) +G(z¯x)Cov(X)
)
, (18)
where z¯x = 1− p¯x, and
G(z) =
r
1− z
(
1−
1− zN
N(1− z)
)
> 0 for all z in [0, 1]. (19)
If X is monomorphic, Cov(X) = 0, and hence, Eq. (7) is recovered. Monomor-
phic and polymorphic populations differ in the additional terms,−a11(x
∗)Cov(X)/p¯x
and G(z¯x)Cov(X) in Eq. (18), which would lead to some changes in orbits
along which the average strategy x¯ travels.
We have analyzed in Sect. 4.2 that there is a chance of polymorphism along
a normal of the selection gradient in the quadrant II or IV. Thus, the slopes of
the normals are negative, and also is the resulting covariance between the two
traits Cov(X). This leads to such that a diversified population (and its average
strategy) in II and IV can turn in and out of those former orbits, respectively,
as in Eq. (18). In the case of the quadrant I or III, there is no (+,+)-part and
thus a rare possibility to maintain dimorphism that resulted from mutations.
As such, it is not required to consider the effects of the additional term in Eq.
(18) in I and III. From these arguments, we could state that there is a specific
region of the strategy space in which populations tend to be with the negative
covariance and are likely to be pulled into inner orbits.
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Singular strategies for polymorphic populations
From Eq. (18) we understand that Q is an equilibrium point even if X is
polymorphic. Here we investigate the stability of the population with x∗ = Q.
We calculate the Jacobian of the selection gradient D(x¯) in Eq. (18) with
respect to (cx∗ , px∗). Considering that Cov(X)/p¯x = cx∗ − c¯x is independent
of px∗ , F (1− pQ) = 0, and (r − 1)cQ − σ = 0, we obtain
J |x∗=Q =

 0 pQF ′(1 − pQ)
(r − 1)(1− (1 − pQ)
N−1) Cov(X)
(
−F ′(1− pQ)
pQ
) . (20)
Theorem 1 The center Q is stable if and only if Cov(X) < 0.
Proof Since 0 < pQ < 1 and F
′(1 − pQ) < 0, the off-diagonal elements of
J |x∗=Q are of opposite sign and the remaining diagonal element has the same
sign as Cov(X). Thus, we have that detJ |x∗=Q > 0 and that the sign of
trJ |x∗=Q is the same as Cov(X). The stability of the representative strategy at
Q, x∗ = Q, is extensively analyzed, as follows: if Cov(X) > 0, then trJ |x∗=Q >
0 and det J |x∗=Q > 0, and hence, Q is unstable; otherwise, if Cov(X) < 0,
then trJ |x∗=Q < 0 and detJ |x∗=Q > 0, and hence, Q is stable. ⊓⊔
In the individual-based simulations the symmetry of distribution is hardly
maintained when considering mutations. After the symmetric distribution
breaks, if Cov(X) < 0, the representative strategy x∗ would stay at Q. Since
x∗ = Q leads to a situation where any mutant can invade the population
by neutral drift, the population is likely to continue spreading as long as the
negative covariance is maintained. This process would lead the distribution
to evolve into a diagonally spread form with a negative slope, actually as is
demonstrated by the numerical investigations. If Cov(X) > 0, then x∗ will go
away from Q. When x∗ 6= Q, cloud-like populations diversified through neutral
drift would shrink into a shape determined such that S(X, xi) = S(x
∗, xi) = 0
for any patch xi of X .
5 Discussion
We investigate a model for understanding the evolution of cooperation among
individuals in free and anonymous societies. It is well known in discrete-
strategy models that voluntary participation plays an important role in main-
taining the level of cooperation [13,14,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60] as well as
in promoting the evolution of costly punishment for collective actions [61,
62,63,64,65,66,67,68] (see also [69]). There are a handful of prior theoreti-
cal studies about the co-evolution of continuous investment in public good
games and other continuous properties, such as costly punishment (severity,
strictness, tolerance, etc.) [70,71]: in particular Shimao and Nakamaru [71]
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considered the evolution of graduated punishment in well-mixed populations
and demonstrated the possibility of strategy diversification. Yet, little has been
known about the consequences of continuously varying participation probabil-
ity. We have analyzed gradual co-evoution of participation probability in the
continuous public good game and shown that the evolutionary dynamics is
characterised three phases: osciallation, convergence, and unchecked strategy-
diversficiation and collapse to a single strategy.
Despite being a simple model set in well-mixed populsations, the contin-
uous voluntary public good game is capable of a wide variety of evolutionary
scenarios, roughly classified into oscillations (rock-scissors-paper cycle) and
dispersal (emergence of the specific correlation among the traits). We fully
analyze the adaptive dynamics for monomorphic populations for the model.
We remark that the dynamics obtained are qualitatively different of those for
discrete voluntary public good games [13,14] (see also [72] for effects of small
populations in the discrete games). In the discrete case oscillations occur in
population compositions (fractions of cooperators, defectors, and nonpartici-
pants). However, in the continuous case oscillations occur in individual traits
(levels of cooperation and participation if individuals). The cyclic movement
along periodical closed orbits could be described as in a rock-scissors-paper
cycle: if most strategies are cooperative, it would be profitable to reduce in-
vestment; if more defective strategies are prevalent, it would be better to more
frequently exit; if most individuals tend to be nonparticipants at most times,
then small interaction groups form most frequently, in which case increasing
in the cooperation and participation levels is more beneficial than otherwise.
We note that the theoretical results, depicted in Fig. 6, continue to hold even
if a single participant would benefit from the good provision, instead of the
loner’s payoff σ. See Appendix A.4 for details.
We have analyzed the unfolding evolutionary dynamics using the theory of
adaptive dynamics. This worked well for understanding the initial oscillatory
phase in which individual levels of cooperation and participation gradually
converged to a singular center Q. At this point, the invasion fitness vanish en-
tirely and all mutant strategies have the same expected payoff as the resident
strategy. This can be understood as an instance of the Bishop-Cannings theo-
rem [73] in evolutionary game theory. To understand the dispersal phase that
ensues, we established a condition for mutual invasibility of nearby strategies
and showed that strategy diversification can continue as long as the covari-
ance of individual cooperation and participation levels is negative. While the
process of diversification may continue for quite some time, random drift even-
tually results in imbalances and the manifestation of positive covariance. At
this point, the cloud of coexisting strategies unexpectedly collapses and the
process begins anew.
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Appendix A
A.1 Invasion fitness
Here we first calculate the expected payoff of a mutant within a monomorphic or polymorphic
resident population with finite support. We then introduce the invasion fitness of a mutant
extended to being with a probability distribution.
For monomorphic populations
The probability that the rare participating mutant (we assume, of the infinitesimally small
frequency) finds no co-participant and N − 1 nonparticipants from the resident population
with (cx, px) is (1−px)N−1. In the case by assumption the public good games does not hold
and the single participant only earns σ. Or otherwise, the mutant player should find from the
resident population S − 1 co-participants and N − S nonparticipants with 2 ≤ S ≤ N , with
probability
(N−1
S−1
)
pS−1x (1− px)N−S . Hence, the mutant will obtain the net benefit through
the participation, r
S
((S − 1)cx + cy)− cy. The payoff of the rare participating mutant is
g(x, y) = (1 − px)
N−1σ +
N∑
S=2
(N−1
S−1
)
pS−1x (1− px)
N−S
[
r((S − 1)cx + cy)
S
− cy
]
= (1 − px)
N−1σ +
N∑
S=2
(N−1
S−1
) 1
S
pS−1x (1− px)
N−Sr(cy − cx)
+
N∑
S=2
(N−1
S−1
)
pS−1x (1− px)
N−S (rcx − cy)
= (1 − px)
N−1σ +
1
N
N∑
S=2
(N
S
)
pS−1x (1− px)
N−Sr(cy − cx)
+
N−1∑
S′=1
(N−1
S′
)
pS
′
x (1 − px)
(N−1)−S′ (rcx − cy)
= (1 − px)
N−1σ +
(
1− (1− px)N
Npx
− (1 − px)
N−1
)
r(cx − cy)
+(1− (1− px)
N−1)(rcx − cy)
= (1 − px)
N−1σ + (1 − (1− px)
N−1)(r − 1)cx − (cy − cx)F (1− px), (A.1)
where
(N−1
S−1
)
1
S
=
(N
S
)
1
N
and F (z) is as in Eq. (5). This yields the mutant’s payoff P (x, y)
in Eq. (4) and the invasion fitness S(x, y) in Eq. (6).
For polymorphic populations
We consider a polymorphic resident population consisting of different K patches (1 ≤ K <
∞), denoted as X = {(xi, ni)}i=1,··· ,K , where xi represents a two-dimensional strategy
given by xi = (cxi, pxi) and ni represents the relative frequency of strategy xi. Thus, ni ≥ 0
and
∑K
i=1 ni = 1. Let us, in general, denote by P (X, y) the expected payoff of an individual
with strategy y = (cy , py) interacting with other N − 1 individuals randomly selected from
the polymorphic resident population X. As well, g(X, y) denotes the individual’s expected
payoff when the individual participates with probability py. Hence,
P (X, y) = pyg(X, y) + (1− py)σ, (A.2)
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As well as in the case of monomorphic populations, thus, the invasion fitness for the rare
mutant within the polymorphic resident population is defined as
S(X, y) = P (X, y)− P¯ (X), (A.3)
in which P¯ (X) describes the average payoff over the polymorphic resident population, given
by
∑K
i=1 niP (X,xi).
We next estimate the probability that the focal participant with y = (cy , py) finds from
the resident population S − 1 co-participants and N − S nonparticipants. In the case S = 1
(no resident participates), the focal participant obtains the payoff σ by assumption. This
happens with probability (
∑K
i=1 ni(1− pxi))
N−1 = (1− p¯x)N−1, where p¯x :=
∑K
i=1 nipxi.
Meanwhile, in the case S > 1, the event probability of that is given by
(N−1
S−1
)
·
∑
s1+···+sK
=S−1,
si≥0
( S−1
s1,· · ·, sK
) K∏
j=1
(njpxj)
sj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
·
∑
t1+···+tK
=N−S,
tk≥0
( N−S
t1,· · ·, tK
) K∏
l=1
(nl(1 − pxl))
tl
︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
, (A.4)
where the terms a and b denote the probabilistic sum of combination ofK-type strategies,
respectively, among S − 1 participants and among remaining N − S nonparticipants. With
the combination of participants in Eq. (A.4), (s1, · · · , sK), the focal participant earns
r
S
(
K∑
i=1
sicxi + cy
)
− cy =
r
S
K∑
i=1
sicxi + cy
( r
S
− 1
)
. (A.5)
Considering the event probability, thus, the focal participant’s expected payoff is
(N − 1
S − 1
)
a b
[
r
S
K∑
k=1
skcxk + cy
( r
S
− 1
)]
=
(N − 1
S − 1
)
b
[
a cy
( r
S
− 1
)
+
r
S
K∑
k=1
∑
s1+···+sK
=S−1,
si≥0
( S − 1
s1, · · · , sK
) K∏
j=1
(njpxj)
sj

 sk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
cxk
]
.
(A.6)
From the multinomial series expansion, the terms a and b are identical to (n1px1+ · · ·+
nKpxK)
S−1 = p¯S−1x and (n1(1−px1)+· · ·+nK(1−pxK))
N−S = (1−p¯x)N−S , respectively.
Since
( S−1
s1,··· ,sk,··· ,sK
)
sk =
( S−2
s1,··· ,sk−1,··· ,sK
)
(S−1) for 1 ≤ ∀k ≤ K, the term c in Eq.
(A.6) can be rewritten as
∑
s1+···+sK
=S−1,
si≥0
( S−1
s1,· · ·, sk,· · ·, sK
) K∏
j=1
(njpxj)
sj

 sk
= (S−1)(nkpxk)
∑
s1+···+s
′
k+
···+sK=S−2,
si≥0,s
′
k≥0
( S−2
s1,· · ·, s′k,· · ·, sK
)
(n1px1)
s1 · · · (nkpxk)
s′k · · · (nKpxK)
sK
(where s′k := sk − 1 )
= (S−1)(nkpxk)(n1px1 + · · ·+ nKpxK)
S−2
= (S−1)(nkpxk)p¯
S−2
x . (A.7)
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Thus, we obtain the analytical expression of g(X, y), as follows:
g(X, y) = (1 − p¯x)
N−1σ +
N∑
S=2
(N − 1
S − 1
)
(1 − p¯x)
N−S
[
p¯S−1x cy
( r
S
− 1
)
+ p¯S−2x
r(S − 1)
S
K∑
i=1
nipxicxi
]
= (1 − p¯x)
N−1σ +
N∑
S=2
(N − 1
S − 1
)
p¯S−1x (1− p¯x)
N−S
[
cy
( r
S
− 1
)
+
r(S − 1)
S
K∑
i=1
nipxi
p¯x
cxi
]
= (1 − p¯x)
N−1σ +
N∑
S=2
(N − 1
S − 1
)
p¯S−1x (1− p¯x)
N−S
[
r
S
(
(S − 1)
K∑
i=1
nipxi
p¯x
cxi+cy
)
−cy
]
. (A.8)
We note that Eq. (A.8) can be applied to the case that the rate mutant y = (cy, py) has
a small yet finite mass ǫ > 0, with considering the mutant’s patch (xK+1, nK+1) = (y, ǫ) in
the resident population of K + 1 patches, X = {(xi, ni)}i=1,··· ,K+1 with K ≥ 1. It is clear
that as ǫ → 0, we can recover Eq. (A.8) for the rare mutant with the infinitesimally small
mass and the resident with K patches; in particular Eq. (A.1) for K = 1.
Mapping polymorphism to monomorphism
This yields a natural mapping from polymorphic populations to monomorphic populations,
such that it keeps the expected payoff of a mutant unchanged. Let us put
cx∗ :=
K∑
i=1
nipxi
p¯x
cxi, (A.9)
px∗ := p¯x, (A.10)
which define a mapping from the set of polymorphic populations with finite support to the
set of monomorphic populations, as follows:
π : X 7−→ x∗ := (cx∗ , px∗). (A.11)
Using this, we represent g(X, y) in Eq. (A.8), as follows:
g(X, y) = (1 − px∗ )
N−1σ +
N∑
S=2
(N − 1
S − 1
)
px∗
S−1(1 − px∗)
N−S
[
r((S − 1)cx∗ + cy)
S
− cy
]
= (1 − px∗ )
N−1σ + (1− (1− px∗)
N−1)(r − 1)cx∗ − (cy − cx∗)F (1− px∗), (A.12)
where F (z) is in Eq. (5). In particular, if a resident population X is monomorphic with
strategy x, Eq. (A.12) is consistent with the former Eq. (A.1), that is, g(X, y) = g(x∗, y)
and thus P (X, y) = P (x∗, y). Therefore, in this continuous-strategy game, the expected
payoff of a mutant within any polymorphic residents with finite support can be calculated
by using the mapping π in Eq. (A.11). Let us clarify the difference between the strategy
x∗ = (cx∗ , px∗ ) and the average strategy x¯ = (c¯x, p¯x) given by (
∑K
i=1 nicxi,
∑K
i=1 nipxi).
Obviously, px∗ = p¯x, yet
cx∗ − c¯x =
∑K
i=1 ninj(cxi − cxj)(pxi − pxj)∑K
i=1 nipxi
=
Cov(cx, px)
p¯x
. (A.13)
Extend to polymorphic mutants
Moreover, we extend the expected payoff to a mutant with probability distribution with
finite support, as resident populations. Let us represent the mutant’s distribution as Y =
{(yi,mi)}1≤i≤K′ , where yi = (cyi, pyi) and mi is the relative frequency of strategy yi
(1 ≤ i ≤ K ′). We define the expected payoff of a mutant with distribution Y in a resident
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population with distribution X, by weighted sum of the expected payoff of Y ’s each patch,
as follows:
P (X, Y ) :=
K′∑
i=1
miP (X, yi) =
K′∑
i=1
miP (x
∗, yi). (A.14)
From Eq. (A.12),
K′∑
i=1
mipyig(X, yi)
=

K′∑
i=1
mipyi

[(1−px∗)N−1σ + (1−(1−px∗ )N−1)(r−1)cx∗ −
(∑K′
i=1mipyicyi∑K′
i=1mipyi
− cx∗
)
F (1−px∗)
]
= py∗g(X, y
∗), (A.15)
where y∗ = (cy∗ , py∗) is given by π(Y ) = (
∑K′
i=1mipyi,
∑K′
i=1mipyicyi/
∑K′
i=1mipyi).
Thus, we obtain
K′∑
i=1
miP (x
∗, yi) =
K′∑
i=1
mi(pyig(X, yi) + (1− pyi)σ)
= py∗g(X, y
∗) + (1 − py∗)σ
= P (x∗, y∗), (A.16)
and then,
P (X,Y ) = P (π(X), π(Y )). (A.17)
Finally, we define invasion fitness in the case that the mutant and the resident population
have strategy distributions with finite support, respectively Y and X. Similarly, invasion
fitness is given by
S(X,Y ) = P (X,Y )− P (X,X), (A.18)
Substituting Eqs. (A.3) and (A.11) into Eq. (A.18), we can have the Taylor expansion around
x∗ = (cx∗ , px∗):
S(X, Y ) = −px∗F (zx∗)(cy∗ − cx∗) + ((r − 1)cx∗ − σ)(1 − (1− px∗)
N−1)(py∗ − px∗ )
−F (zx∗)(cy∗ − cx∗)(py∗ − px∗). (A.19)
A.2 Curvatures
At a given focal point x, the curves Cm and Cr have identical slopes. To determine the local
arrangement of Cm and Cr around x, thus we need to calculate those second derivatives,
that is, curvatures. In the case of Cm, we have
p′′y (x) =
∂2py
∂c2y
∣∣∣∣∣
y=x
= 2px
(
a11(x)
a01(x)
)2
, (A.20)
and then the curvature of Cm at x is given by κm(x) = p′′y (x)[1+p
′
y(x)]
−3/2, where p′y(x) =
∂py/∂cy |y=x = −pxa11(x)/a01(x). In the case of Cr , we have
p′′y (x) = 2px
a11(x)
a201(x)
(
a′01(x) + pxF
′(1− px)
)
, (A.21)
where a′01(x) = ∂a01(y)/∂cy |y=x. We can then calculate the curvature κr(x) of Cr at x, as
well as κm(x).
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Let us investigate the signs of κm(x), κr(x), and κr(x)− κm(x) given by
2px
[1 + p′y(x)]
3/2
(
a11(x)
a01(x)
)(
a′01(x) + pxF
′(1− px) − a11(x)
)
(A.22)
From Eq. (A.20), the sign of κm(x) is always positive. As for the sign of κr(x), we should
have a further calculation in the Eq. (A.21), as follows: putting zx = 1− px,
a′01(x) + (1− zx)F
′(zx)
= −(1− zN−1x ) + r
(
1−
1− zNx
N(1− zx)
)(
1 +
(N − 1)(1 − zx)z
N−2
x
1− zN−1x
)
≥
[
−(1−zN−1x )+2
(
1−
1− zNx
N(1−zx)
)]
+ r
(
1−
1−zNx
N(1−zx)
)(
1+
(N−1)(1−zx)z
N−2
x
1−zN−1x
)
,
(A.23)
where all the terms are positive if zx 6= 1, and otherwise zero. We note that
−(1− zN−1x ) + 2
(
1−
1− zNx
N(1 − zx)
)
= (1 − zx)
2
[
(N − 2)(1 + · · ·+ zN−3x ) + · · ·+ (N − 2k)(z
k−1
x + · · ·+ z
(N−2)−k
x )
+ · · ·+


2(z
N
2
−2
x + z
N
2
x )
]
if N is even,
z
N−3
2
]
if N is odd,
≥ 0 (A.24)
Thus, the sign of κr(x) is equal to the sign of a11(x). As for the sign of κr(x)−κm(x), from
Eqs. (A.20) and (A.21), we need to know the sign of the term as follows:
a′01(x) + (1 − zx)F
′(zx)− a11(x)
= r
[(
−(1−zN−1x )+2
(
1−
1− zNx
N(1−zx)
))
+
(N−1)(1−zx)z
N−2
x
1− zN−1x
(
1−
1− zNx
N(1−zx)
)]
(A.25)
From Eq. (A.24), the above is positive if zx 6= 1, and otherwise, zero. Therefore, the sign of
κr(x) − κm(x) is equal to the sign of a11(x), as well as κr(x).
A.3 Replicator dynamics for two strategies
We analyze frequency dynamics between two strategies with x1 = (c1, p1) and x2 = (c2, p2).
We assume that the growth rate of strategy is determined by the replicator dynamics. It
has already been studied in a special case of c1 = 0 and c2 = 1, that is, consisting of full
defection and full cooperation which are extended to be with probabilities to participate
in the public good game [27]. The replicator dynamics in the special case have been clas-
sified into four fundamental types of evolutionary scenario in two-strategy games, given by
dominance, coexistence, bi-stability, and neutrality. Here we present a general classification
for two arbitrary strategies x1 and x2 in the strategy space U . It then turns out that sim-
ilarly, the evolutionary scenario can be determined by the combination of signs, given by
(sgn S(x2, x1), sgn S(x1, x2)).
Let us denote as Xh a mixed state between x1 and x2, with relative frequencies h and
h−1 respectively. To investigate the evolutionary fate of such the dimorphic population, we
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should know the payoff difference between x1 and x2 in the environment set by the mixed
state Xh, that is, the advantage function given by
P (Xh, x1)− P (Xh, x2) =: F˜12(h), (A.26)
where P (Xh, xi) denotes the expected payoff of strategy xi (i = 1, 2) within the mixed pop-
ulation Xh. The average payoff over the population is given by P (Xh,Xh) = hP (Xh, x1) +
(1 − h)P (Xh, x2). Using the relative average payoff S(Xh, xi) := P (Xh, xi) − P (Xh,Xh)
(i = 1, 2), we obtain
F˜12(h) = S(Xh, x1)− S(Xh, x2), (A.27)
in particular,
F˜12(0) = S(x2, x1), F˜12(1) = −S(x1, x2). (A.28)
The replicator equation is given by
h˙ = h(P (Xh, x1)− P (Xh, Xh)) = hS(Xh, x1)
= h(1− h)(P (Xh, x1) − P (Xh, x2))
= h(1− h)F˜12(h). (A.29)
From a straightforward calculation, F˜12(h) can be rewritten as
F˜12(h) = [(c1 − cQ)p1 − (c2 − cQ)p2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
(r − 1)(1 − zN−1h )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Z1)
+(c2 − c1)p1p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
r
1− zh
(
1−
1− zNh
N(1− zh)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Z2)
,
(A.30)
where zh = 1 − ph = 1 − (hp1 + (1− h)p2) and cQ =
σ
r−1
. In particular, if p1 = p2 (=: p),
Eq. (A.30) is reduced, as follows:
F˜12(h) = (c2−c1)p
[
−(r − 1)(1 − zN−1) + r
(
1−
1− zN
N(1− z)
)]
= (c2−c1)p ·F (z), (A.31)
where z = 1− p which is independent of h. In the reduced case, thus F˜12(h) must constant
and the replicator dynamics is unilateral toward either of the two extreme states. Which one
is a global attractor depends on two kinds of magnitude relation: c1 and c2; and, if r > 2,
also p and pQ, where pQ is the unique interior root of F (1− pQ). If p = 0, the dynamics is
neutral. In the following section we consider the general case: p1 6= p2.
We first consider this general case that both (A) and (B) are non-zero. If the boundary
values F˜12(0) and F˜12(1) have signs that are opposite to each other ( ⇐⇒ S(x2, x1) and
S(x1, x2) have same signs, from Eq. (A.28)), F˜12(h) has to have at least one interior root
within [0, 1]. In the case we show that F˜12(h) is monotonic and thus the interior root is
unique, as follows. Since there exists h such that Eq. (A.29) = 0 holds, the term (A) < 0,
if the term (B) > 0 (⇔ c2 > c1), or the term (A) > 0, if the term (B) < 0 (⇔ c2 < c1).
Differentiate F˜12(h) with respect to h,
dF˜12
dh
=
dF˜12
dzh
dzh
dh
=

((c1 − cQ)p1 − (c2 − cQ)p2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
· − (r − 1)(N − 1)zN−2h︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Z1’)
+ (c2 − c1)p1p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
r
N
((N−2)+2(N−3)zh+· · ·+(N−2)z
N−3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Z2’)

(p2 − p1).
(A.32)
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Since the term (Z1’) < 0 and the term (Z2’) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1),
dF˜12
dh
{
> 0 if (c1 − c2)(p1 − p2) > 0 ,
< 0 if (c1 − c2)(p1 − p2) < 0 .
(A.33)
Therefore, F˜12(h) is monotonic and the interior root is unique if it exists. If (sgnS(x2, x1), sgnS(x1, x2))
is (−,−), we have that F˜12(0) < 0 and F˜12(1) > 0 in Eq. (A.28)), and the monotonicity
leads to that F˜12(h) is increasing. Thus the interior fixed point exists and is a repellor
(“bi-stability”). If (sgn S(x2, x1), sgn S(x1, x2)) is (+,+), similarly, F˜12(0) > 0, F˜12(1) < 0,
and F˜12(h) is decreasing. Thus the interior fixed point exists and is an attractor (“coexis-
tence”). If (sgn S(x2, x1), sgn S(x1, x2)) is (+,−), we have that both F˜12 and F˜12(1) > 0.
Thus, F˜12(h) has no interior root and the uniform state with x1 is a global attractor (“x1-
dominance”). Finally, if (sgn S(x2, x1), sgn S(x1, x2)) is (−,+), then that both F˜12 and
F˜12(1) < 0. Similarly, thus there exists no interior root and the other uniform state with xs
is a global attractor (“xs-dominance”).
We turn to the boundary cases. Let us first assume that only (B) equals zero. It follows
that (B) = 0 ⇐⇒ c1 = c2, p1 = 0 or p2 = 0. In the case of c1 = c2 (=: c), F˜12(h) is
reduced to
F˜12(h) = (c− cQ)(p1 − p2)(r − 1)(1 − z
N−1
h ). (A.34)
The sign of F˜12(h) above is unchanged, and thus the direction of dynamics is unilateral.
A global attractor is determined by the sign of (c − cQ)(p1 − p2). Similarly, in the case of
p2 = 0, if c1 > cQ, the dynamics is x1-dominance, or otherwise, x2-dominance; in the case
of p1 = 0, if c2 > cQ, the dynamics is x2-dominance, or otherwise, x1-dominance. If only
(A) equals zero, it follows from Eq. (A.32) that the dynamics is x1-dominance if c2 > c1, or
otherwise, x2-dominance. Finally, if both (A) and (B) equal zero, the dynamics is neutral.
A.4 Continuous voluntary public good games with stand-alone play
We examine continuous public good game with stand-alone play. We assume that a single
participant with contribution level c would receive rc− c from the good provision, instead
of the loner’s payoff σ. In this case it is clear that if the contribution level is greater than
cQ = σ/(r − 1), nonparticipation is no longer individually rational: each point of the line
p = 0 is no longer a Nash equilibrium. As in Sect. 2.2, the probability that a mutant
player with strategy y finds itself among the S − 1 resident co-players with strategy x is(N−1
S−1
)
pS−1x (1− px)
N−S , yet the number of players S can vary between 1 and N . Thus, Eq.
(A.1) turns into
g(x, y) =
N∑
S=1
(N−1
S−1
)
pS−1x (1− px)
N−S
[
r((S − 1)cx + cy)
S
− cy
]
= (r − 1)cx − (cy − cx)F0(1− px), (A.35)
where F0(z) = 1−r(1−zN )/(N(1−z)). We note that for 1 < r < N , F0(z) is monotonically
decreasing and has a unique root in the open interval (0, 1). Hence, using cQ = σ/(r − 1),
P (x, y) = σ + (r − 1)(cx − cQ)py − (cy − cx)pyF0(1 − px). (A.36)
Indeed, this yields a similar system, as follows: c˙ = −pF0(1− p) and p˙ = (r− 1)(c− cQ). in
contrast to the original system, the variant system is so simple that has only two singular
points, a center point and a boundary saddle point with p = 0. This center point exists for
all r within 1 < r < N .
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